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Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the
Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct
Randal D. Heeb,* William E. Kovacic,**
Robert C. Marshall,*** and Leslie M. Marx****, *****
Apart from selling finished products made from carbon, such as carbon
brushes, members of the cartel also sold “blocks” of carbon, which have
been pressed but not yet cut and tooled into brushes or other products. A
number of third-party “cutters” purchase these blocks of carbon, cut and
work them into final products and sell them to customers. These cutters,
while customers of the cartel members, also represent competition to them
for finished products. Such cutters are typically located in the Middle East
or Eastern Europe, but a number of them are located in the EEA
[European Economic Area]. The policy of the cartel consisted in fixing the
prices of carbon blocks sold to cutters in such a way that competition from
them for the finished products made out of those blocks would be limited.
As a result, cutters would usually only obtain small customers that were of
no interest to the large suppliers. Ideally, at least in the view of some
members, cutters should be eliminated altogether by refusing to supply to
them.1

I. I NTRODUCTION
Discussions about the relationship between European and US competition
policy today focus extensively on standards for evaluating the conduct of
*
**

***
****
*****
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Bates White, LLC.
Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; Professor, George Washington University Law
School (on leave).
Penn State University.
Duke University.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Federal Trade Commission or its individual Commissioners. Coauthors Marshall and Marx thank
the Human Capital Foundation (http://hcfoundation.ru/en/) for its support.
Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products, Case COMP/E-2/38.359, 2004/420/EC,
¶154 (Dec 3, 2003), available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions/38359/en.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009).
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dominant firms. In both jurisdictions, there is awareness that various forms of
dominant firm behavior present both anticompetitive and procompetitive
possibilities. In a number of cases there appear to be procompetitive
motivations for conduct that may also have anticompetitive effects.
Economic theory is sometimes ambiguous about whether and under what
conditions a particular type of conduct is on balance pro- or anticompetitive.
For example, slotting allowances and exclusive-dealing contracts are two
practices that may be anticompetitive in some situations but not in others.
Slotting allowances are fixed fees paid by manufacturers to retailers ostensibly to
obtain access to shelf space, defray upfront costs, and support downstream
promotional activities.2 A prominent theory of competitive harm posits that a
large manufacturer may abuse its dominance when it uses upfront payments to
bid up the price of scarce shelf space in order to raise its rivals’ costs.3 An
alternative view is that slotting allowances enhance social welfare by giving
retailers an efficient way to allocate scarce retail shelf space.4 In antitrust law,
2

3

4

See Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting
Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry 1 (Feb 2001), available online at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009);
FTC, Slotting Allowances in the Retail Grocery Industry: Selected Case Studies in Five Product Categories iv–
viii
(Nov
2003),
available
online
at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009); David
Balto, Recent Legal and Regulatory Developments in Slotting Allowances and Category Management, 21 J Pub
Poly & Mktg 289, 292–94 (2002) (all discussing the modern use and competitive implications of
slotting allowances).
See Canadian Bureau of Competition, The Abuse of Dominance Provisions (Sections 78 and 79 of the
Competition Act) as Applied to the Canadian Grocery Sector Section 5.2.1 (Nov 2002), available online at
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01642.html> (visited Apr 8,
2009); FTC, Report on Slotting Allowances at 37 (2001) (cited in note 2); Paul N. Bloom, Gregory T.
Gundlach, and Joseph P. Cannon, Slotting Allowances and Fees: Schools of Thought and the Views of
Practicing Managers, 64 Mktg 92, 96 (2000). See also Leslie M. Marx and Greg Shaffer, Upfront
Payments and Exclusion in Downstream Markets, 38 Rand J Econ 823, 824 (2007) (slotting allowances
may arise in environments with buyer power and may result in exclusion of some retailers); Greg
Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices, 22 Rand J
Econ 120, 121 (1991) (slotting allowances can benefit retailers because by not seeking a lower
wholesale price, a retailer “essentially announces its intention to be less aggressive in its pricing”).
The typical story posits that each manufacturer possesses private information about whether its
product will be a “success” or “failure” in the marketplace, and that by offering slotting fees the
manufacturer can credibly convey this information to retailers. See, for example, Martin A.
Lariviere and V. Padmanabhan, Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions, 16 Mktg Sci 112,
113–14 (1997); Kenneth Kelly, Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances: The Procompetitive Case,
10 J Pub Poly & Mktg 187, 187–88 (1991). See also Mary W. Sullivan, Slotting Allowances and the
Market for New Products, 40 J L & Econ 461, 461 (1997) (slotting fees are “consistent with
competitive behavior” and could have been caused by an increase in the supply of new products).
Alternatively, by demanding upfront payments, retailers can effectively screen which
manufacturers’ products are better than others. See Wujin Chu, Demand Signalling and Screening in
Channels of Distribution, 11 Mktg Sci 327, 327–29 (1992).
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exclusive-dealing contracts are judged by the rule of reason.5 Some authors have
shown that exclusive dealing sometimes can enhance efficiency,6 while others
have demonstrated that exclusive dealing may enable one firm to monopolize
the market.7
A number of difficulties have hampered empirical efforts to determine
which reasoning applies in a particular circumstance.8 In trying to assess market
effects and assess economic harm in terms of deadweight loss, the behavior of a
single dominant firm is difficult to analyze since there is often neither a clear
beginning date nor a clear termination date for the conduct in question. Thus, it
is hard to find a reliable benchmark against which to assess the conduct. In
addition, the counterfactual world in which the relevant behavior does not occur
may be structurally different from the observed situation, making welfare
comparisons difficult.
In the debate over the appropriate standards for analysis under antitrust
proscriptions against dominant-firm misconduct, many have observed that
5

6

7

8

If a substantial fraction of the retail market has been foreclosed, exclusive dealing may be found
to 1) “substantially lessen competition” under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 USC § 14 (2000); 2) be
“an unfair method of competition” under § 5 of the FTC Act, 15 USC § 45 (2000); and 3) be
conduct in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 2 (2000 & Supp 2004).
See Tim R. Sass, The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry, 23 Intl
J Indust Org 203, 204 (2005); Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Contracts and
Protection of Investments, 31 Rand J Econ 603, 609 (2000); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J
L Econ 1, 2 (1982).
Works in this vein include Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Naked
Exclusion, 81 Am Econ Rev 1137, 1137–38 (1991) (demonstrating that exclusion can arise when
there are economies of scale in upstream production and coordination failures at the downstream
level); Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 Am Econ Rev 388,
398–99 (1987) (showing that exclusive-dealing contracts that contain penalty-escape clauses can
lead to inefficient exclusion); G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter, The Competitive Effects of
Vertical Agreements: Comment, 77 Am Econ Rev 1057, 1057–58 (1987) (giving conditions under
which a dominant manufacturer can profitably induce a retailer to agree to exclusive dealing by
offering a lower per-unit price that compensates the retailer for its lost revenue from not selling
excluded manufacturers’ products). For extensions of Mathewson and Winter to allow nonlinear
pricing, see B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J Pol Econ 64,
65–68 (1998); Daniel P. O'Brien and Greg Shaffer, Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and
Equilibrium Market Foreclosure, 6 J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 755, 755–58 (1997). See generally Ilya R.
Segal and Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 Am Econ Rev 296 (2000); David
Besanko and Martin K. Perry, Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products
Oligopoly, 24 Rand J Econ 646 (1993); Marius Schwartz, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements:
Comment, 77 Am Econ Rev 1063 (1987).
Sass analyzes data on US beer distributors and obtains results that support the view that exclusive
dealing serves to minimize manufacturer-dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare.
Sass, 203 Intl J Indust Org at 220 (cited in note 6). For other empirical work, see generally Jan B.
Heide, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from
Industry Practice, 41 J L & Econ 387 (1998); Margaret E. Slade, Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of
Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?, 108 Econ J 565 (1998).
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conduct that generates potential concern under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or
Article 82 of the Treaty of Europe is common in competitive industries. In these
industries there is little hope of successfully monopolizing the market, and
therefore the behavior must have legitimate business justifications.9 By
extension, this observation is used to cast doubt on claims of anticompetitive
effects of similar practices by dominant firms.
A contrasting observation derived from the study of cartels may be used to
make the opposite point. Conduct that an illegal cartel orchestrates to suppress
competition might be reasonably suspected of having an anticompetitive
rationale. For example, suppose that cartel members engage in no
monopolization conduct before forming the cartel but implement the conduct
after the establishment of a common scheme has increased their market power.
Such a change in behavior suggests that the conduct benefits the cartel members
only in the presence of market power and may suggest that the conduct seeks to
extend or preserve the cartel’s monopoly power rather than to promote
efficiency.
This observation has implications for the programs undertaken by
competition authorities in Europe, the United States, and other jurisdictions to
challenge cartels and improper exclusionary behavior by dominant firms.10
Rather than viewing enforcement against cartels and firms engaged in
monopolization as discrete, self-contained endeavors, enforcement policy should
recognize connections between the two. It seems likely that one can find
definitive proof of the pro- or anticompetitive nature of a cartel’s
monopolization behavior by examining the evidentiary record yielded by a cartel
inquiry. If, as we suspect, cartels undertake these activities in trying to extend or
preserve their monopoly, this insight would be useful to determine whether or
not the same conduct should be viewed with suspicion when engaged in by a
dominant firm in a similar industry.
In this Article we propose that monopolization conduct be analyzed
through the lens of cartel behavior. Although cartels typically suppress interfirm
rivalry, in many instances this is not their sole focus. Many cartels operate as

9

10

See, for example, Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations 95 (Apr 2007),
available
online
at
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/
amc_final_report.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009).
Throughout the remainder of this Article we use the term monopolization to refer to behaviors
that would that would be candidates for monopolization under US antitrust law and to
behavaviors that would be candidates for abuse of dominance under European Commission
(“EC”) competition law. For a discussion of the differences between the US monopolization
doctrine and the EC abuse-of-dominance position law, see Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin,
Global Competition Law and Economics 300–14 (Hart 2007).
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two-stage mechanisms.11 The first stage consists of reaching a consensus on a
plan to restrict output or otherwise curb rivalry. For many cartels, once interfirm
rivalry is addressed, the cartel moves to the second stage of activity, in which it
uses exclusionary behavior often featured in monopolization cases to ensure the
effectiveness of its efforts to restrict output. To illustrate this phenomenon, we
draw upon the records of cartel inquiries to provide examples of cartels engaging
in overt predation against non-cartel rivals, leveraging into both downstream and
horizontally-related markets, exclusively dealing, blocking entry, bundling, tying,
raising rivals’ costs, and other conduct typically associated with allegations of
monopolization.
The analytical approach outlined in this Article illuminates the competitive
significance of conduct by which individual dominant firms are claimed to have
monopolized or attempted to monopolize markets. A focus on cartel
applications of monopolization behavior has significant advantages for empirical
investigation. First, cartel inquiries often generate a rich evidentiary record.
Moreover, in the case of a leniency applicant, this record may include
information provided with the active cooperation of the subject firm, a situation
that does not arise in the context of a monopolization or dominance
investigation. Even if much of this information is nonpublic, economists and
lawyers in the public antitrust agencies may be able to analyze such data to
inform policy decisions about monopolization matters. Second, unlike a single
dominant firm whose market power may evolve gradually through time, cartels
often begin and end at discrete moments, and for cartels that are prosecuted the
beginning and end dates are typically known. As a result, some of the more
complicated inference problems that arise when analyzing the behavior of a
single dominant firm are avoided when focusing on a cartel. Specifically, a
benchmark period can be more readily identified when analyzing cartels than
single dominant firms. Third, the discovery record provides detail regarding the
time span for certain kinds of monopolization behavior, such as predation or
exclusive dealing. Thus, the incremental inference burden of endogenously
determining when the monopolization conduct began and ended is largely
eliminated when analyzing the behavior as an extension of cartel conduct.
Despite the benefits of viewing cartel behavior through the lens of
monopolization behavior, cartel behavior currently tends to be viewed as
something distinct from anticompetitive behavior by a dominant firm.
Enforcement agencies tend to follow the Sherman Act in categorizing
anticompetitive behavior as either a horizontal agreement between competitors
to suppress interfirm rivalry (Section 1) or monopolization behavior by a single
11

The mix of collusive and exclusionary strategies employed by a cartel is emphasized in Andrew I.
Gavil et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective 45–53 (West 2d ed 2008).
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dominant firm (Section 2).12 However, it may be more appropriate to view the
behavior by some cartels as a combination of the two types of anticompetitive
behavior. The historical record suggests that cartels often act like a single
dominant firm, moving from the suppression of competition within the cartel
(interfirm rivalry) to the suppression of competition from outside the cartel.
We address the topic in three parts. In Section II, we extend a well-known
existing framework for analyzing the competitive forces that work against
industry profitability, Michael Porter’s “Five Forces,” to obtain a structure for
understanding both the suppression of interfirm rivalry and monopolization
conduct by a cartel. In Section III, we show that monopolization behaviors are
common in practicing cartels. In Section IV, we pose a number of open
questions and identify public-policy implications regarding the potential lessons
from cartel behavior for understanding monopolization conduct.
As shown by our data, cartels do in fact engage in monopolization
conduct, although the types of behaviors and extent of that conduct vary across
cartels. We adapt Porter’s classic “Five Forces” competitive industry analysis
framework to categorize monopolization conduct. The adapted framework
provides guidance to antitrust authorities investigating such conduct by cartels.
Insights on the pro- versus anticompetitive effects of such conduct derived from
cartel investigations can be applied to monopolization investigations in
industries characterized by similar competitive structure.

II. P ORTER ’ S “F IV E F ORCES ” AND S ECTIONS 1 AND 2
The “Five Forces,” as defined by Michael Porter in his book Competitive
Strategy (1980), are a fundamental component of management education.13 These
“Five Forces,” which act against, or in support of, an industry’s profitability, are
depicted in Figure 1.

12
13

15 USC §§ 1–2 (2009).
Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors 4 (Free Press
1980).
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Potential
entrants
Threat of new entrants

Industry
competitors
Suppliers

Bargaining power

Bargaining power

of suppliers

of buyers

Buyers

Rivalry among
existing firms
Threat of substitute products

Substitutes

Figure 1: Michael Porter’s “Five Forces”14
An industry’s profit depends on the “Five Forces.”
At the center of the diagram is a box representing interfirm rivalry. On the
perimeter are boxes representing the threat of entry, bargaining power of
suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, and the threat of substitute products. All
of these forces work against the profitability of an industry. Although the focus
of Porter’s analysis is on the profitability of an industry as a whole, those profits
are just the sum of the profits of the individual firms, so we can view the “Five
Forces” as applying to individual firms as well.
Consider a cartel that includes all the firms in an industry. In the context of
Figure 1, if the cartel is effective it eliminates—or at least reduces—the antiprofit forces associated with the “rivalry among existing firms” at the center of
Porter’s diagram. The incentive for such collusion may be powerful if interfirm
rivalry is the primary drain on industry and firm profits. When is interfirm rivalry
the primary drain on profits? We can answer this using Porter’s diagram.
Interfirm rivalry is the primary drain on profit when the perimeter forces
depressing profit are not strong—that is, if the threat of entry is small, demand
for the industry’s product is relatively inelastic (meaning that there exist few
substitutes), there are many small buyers, and factor inputs are largely acquired
in a highly competitive marketplace. In addition, because collusion is designed to
eliminate or at least reduce interfirm rivalry, collusion is especially valuable if

14

Id at 4.
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firms’ products are close to perfect substitutes and if interfirm competition is
largely based on price, because then interfirm rivalry has a strong depressing
effect on industry and firm profits.
The factors described in the previous paragraph have been characterized by
Posner as those favorable to collusion.15 Consistent with how these factors are
viewed in antitrust cases, if the perimeter forces working against profit are weak
but the center force of interfirm rivalry is strong, the industry is ripe for
collusion. Thus, Porter’s “Five Forces” framework provides an immediate way
to view Section 1 violations.
To adapt the diagram for use in the study of monopolization conduct, we
make a slight modification. In Figure 2, we provide the same illustration of
Porter’s “Five Forces” except that firms in the industry are divided into two
groups, the cartel firms and the non-cartel firms, which are those that have
either chosen not to participate in the cartel or have not been invited to join the
cartel. In addition, we denote with separate arrows the relation of the cartel and
non-cartel firms with the buyers and suppliers. Relations with potential entrants
and substitutes continue to be represented with one arrow because one would
expect these to affect both cartel and non-cartel firms in similar fashion.
Potential
entrants
Threat of new entrants

Industry
Bargaining

Suppliers

Cartel

power
of suppliers

Bargaining
power

Non-Cartel

of buyers

Buyers

Rivalry among
existing firms
Threat of substitute products

Substitutes

Figure 2. Section 1 and Section 2 in the “Five Forces.”
15

Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 51–100 (Chicago 2d ed 2001).
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As depicted in Figure 2, the firms in the cartel have suppressed interfirm
rivalry among themselves, but non-cartel firms continue to act as rivals with one
another, as well as with the cartel firms. If the cartel firms only suppress rivalry
among themselves, and take no additional actions in the market, then the noncartel firms benefit since they can earn supra-normal profits as a consequence of
the conspiracy yet incur none of the costs associated with operating a cartel.
However, viewing the cartel as a single dominant firm, we can now pose
the question of what conduct the cartel could engage in that would be above and
beyond the suppression of rivalry among the firms in the cartel. There are many
possibilities in this regard but we envision four broad categories. The first
category, which includes behavior designed to harm non-cartel rivals, can be
disaggregated into five different types of behavior.
1.

16

Behavior designed to harm non-cartel rivals.
a. The cartel firms may take actions directed at non-cartel firms, such as
initiating anti-dumping complaints with the goal of preventing foreign
non-cartel firms from being able to undercut the artificially increased
cartel price16 or withholding cost-reducing or quality-improving
technology. The cartel may also put pressure on non-cartel firms to
accommodate certain cartel actions.
b. The cartel firms may enter into contracts with their own buyers that
are designed to harm the ability of the non-cartel firms to negotiate
with those buyers. For example, the use of fidelity discounts, tying, or
bundling by the cartel reduces buyers’ ability to substitute between
firms in the industry. Non-cartel firms are harmed because these
contracts increase buyer bargaining power vis-à-vis non-cartel firms.
c. The cartel firms may take predatory actions directed at the non-cartel
firms’ buyers, such as undercutting the non-cartel prices and
otherwise targeting the non-cartel firms’ buyers.
d. The cartel firms may deprive the non-cartel firms of supply or
increase what the non-cartel firms must pay for inputs (raising rivals’
costs) through contractual arrangements, such as exclusivity, with
cartel input suppliers.
e. The cartel firms may deprive the non-cartel firms of supply or
increase what the non-cartel firms must pay for inputs (raising rivals’
costs) through interference with the non-cartel firms’ input suppliers.
Non-cartel firms that are within the same country or trading area as the cartel firms may benefit
from anti-dumping tariffs imposed on foreign producers.
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2.

3.

4.

For example, if cartel firms are vertically integrated into a downstream
market, and if they supply their downstream competitors, they may
increase prices to disadvantage competitors in the downstream
market.
The cartel firms may engage in actions designed to deter entry. Entry
deterrence may help non-cartel firms as well as cartel firms. Examples of
anticompetitive behaviors that raise entry costs include exclusive or
excessively long contracts with customers, large-volume long-term
contracts with suppliers, capacity expansions, and tying. This behavior,
along with other monopolization behaviors, may prolong the duration of a
cartel.
The cartel firms may engage in actions intended to reduce the
attractiveness and/or availability of substitutes, or to bundle or tie its
products together with complements. Examples may include investing in
research that demonstrates the advantages of the cartel’s products and the
hazards of the substitute products.
Finally, to reduce rivalry, one of the cartel firms may purchase one of the
non-cartel firms or a competitive asset of one of the non-cartel firms.

We can relate this taxonomy of monopolization behaviors to Figure 2.
Behaviors in Category 1.a, actions directed at a cartel’s horizontal competitors,
are behaviors among firms that are inside the “Industry” box shown in Figure 2,
although they may also involve a government authority as in the case of the
abuse of anti-dumping provisions. Behaviors in Category 1.b are those
implemented between the cartel and its own buyers, although they can affect the
relation between those buyers and the non-cartel firms. Referring to Figure 2,
this behavior affects the “Buyers” box shown in the figure as well as the
relationships represented by the arrows shown in the figure between the cartel
and non-cartel firms and the buyers. Behaviors in Category 1.c are those that
focus on the relation between the non-cartel firms and their buyers. In Figure 2,
this behavior affects the “Buyers” box and the arrow between the non-cartel
firms and buyers. Behaviors in Category 1.d are those implemented between the
cartel and its own suppliers, although they can affect the relation between those
suppliers and the non-cartel firms. This behavior affects the “Suppliers” box and
the arrows between the cartel and non-cartel firms and the suppliers. Behaviors
in Category 1.e focus on the relation between the non-cartel firms and their input
suppliers. They affect the “Suppliers” box and the arrow between the non-cartel
firms and suppliers.
Behaviors in Category 2 relate to potential entrants. Referring to Figure 2,
these behaviors act on the “Potential Entrants” box shown there. Behaviors in
Category 3 relate to substitutes. These behaviors affect the “Substitutes” box in
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Figure 2. The fourth category includes behavior that changes which firms are
included in the cartel. These behaviors affect the division between “Cartel” and
“Non-Cartel” firms within the “Industry” box in Figure 2. Thus, all aspects of
Figure 2 are captured in these categories. Thus, the source of industry profits as
identified by Michael Porter are often fully recognized and addressed by cartels,
starting with the groundwork of interfirm rivalry suppression and then spreading
out to the four spokes in Figure 2.
A cartel’s first step is to control intra-cartel rivalry through Section 1
behavior. The other four forces that influence industry profit are also potential
targets for anticompetitive manipulation, either by a single dominant producer
or by a cartel that has successfully turned itself into a dominant producer
through its Section 1 behavior. Exclusive dealing, predatory behavior directed at
non-cartel firms, entry deterrence, tying, and other similar conduct can be used
to suppress competition that might threaten the dominance of the cartel.
One conjecture is that once a cartel controls intra-cartel rivalry, it moves
on to implement practices designed to diminish competition from existing and
potential non-cartel rivals. Such conduct would constitute Section 2 violations
when practiced by a dominant firm. Thus, cartel conduct can provide a window
to understanding anticompetitive monopolization conduct.

III. C ARTELS E NGAGED IN M ONOPOLIZATION C ONDUCT
This section provides a number of examples of cartels engaged in
monopolization conduct. We do not attempt to provide a complete enumeration
of such conduct over all known cartel cases. Instead, we focus on cases from
two sources. First, we consider the European Commission (“EC”) cartel and
price-fixing decisions related to manufactured products from 2000 to the
present.17 Second, we consider the cartels for non-agricultural products described
in the 1945 book Cartels in Action by Stocking and Watkins (“SW”).18 Table 1
below provides specific citations to monopolization behaviors described in these
sources. We give the relevant paragraph number for EC decisions and the
relevant page number for SW.19

17

18
19

Non-manufacturing cases excluded from our analysis include EC Decisions in Fine Art Auction
Houses, Case COMP/E-2/37.784, 30/07/2005 (Oct 30, 2002); Austrian Banks—‘Lombard Club,’
Case COMP/36.571/D-1, 2004/138/EC (June 11, 2002); Bank Charges for Exchanging Euro-Zone
Currencies—Germany, Case COMP/E-1/37.919, 2003/25/EC (Dec 11, 2001).
George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action (Hein 1945).
The paragraphs from the EC decisions cited here are available at Randal D. Heeb et al, Cartels as
Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct (Jan 2009) appendix, available
online at <http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~marx/bio/papers/CATSM_Appendix.pdf> (visited
Apr 5, 2009).
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When analyzing the table, it is important to note that just because we have
no indicator for a particular monopolization behavior does not mean the
behavior did not occur. It simply means the behavior was not described in the
EC case or SW chapter.
Also, it is important to note that the conducts described for the EC
decisions are not restricted to the European Community. Many of these cartels
are international and the conducts described had impact throughout the world,
including the United States. Examples include the Vitamins cartel20 and the Citric
Acid cartel.21 Furthermore, the monopolization conducts described in SW are
largely international in nature.22
The columns correspond to the points enumerated in Section II regarding
Figure 2.
We begin by mentioning some behaviors that are not included in the table
since they are not clearly monopolization behaviors, yet these forms of conduct
go beyond the suppression of intra-cartel rivalry. First, in Vitamins,23 the cartel
purchased the product of non-cartel rivals to prevent that supply from
disrupting the cartel agreement and the cartel’s attempts to increase price.
Second, a number of cases mention coordinated attempts to control the
behavior of distributors. These include Specialty Graphite,24 Choline Chloride,25
Amino Acids,26 Plasterboard,27 Steel,28 and Incandescent Electric Lamp.29
Returning to Table 1, a number of features stand out. First, every column
in Table 1 has an entry. Cartels engage in a broad range of dominant-firm
behaviors. It is interesting that there are no entries among the EC cases
involving the cartel’s use of exclusivity or other contractual agreements with its
suppliers designed to deprive non-cartel rivals of supply, although such behavior
is described in SW. This observation may indicate that EC analysis tends not to
focus on the effect of a cartel on input suppliers. Overall, a fundamental point
that emerges from this paper is that enforcement authorities should be looking
20

21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Vitamins, Case COMP/E-1/37.512, 2003/2/EC, ¶¶ 287–88 (Nov 21, 2001) (describing the
purchase of a US producer of vitamin B2).
Citric Acid, Case No COMP/E-1/36 604, 2002/742/EC, ¶¶ 116, 166 (Dec 5, 2001) (describing
predatory conduct against Chinese producers that was not regionally restricted).
Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action at 3–6 (cited in note 18).
Vitamins, Case COMP/E-1/37.512, ¶¶ 287, 432, 447.
Specialty Graphite, Case COMP/E-2/37.667, ¶¶ 137, 147, 383 (Dec 17, 2002).
Choline Chloride, Case COMP/E-2/37.533, ¶¶ 69, 75, 99, 138 (Dec 9, 2004).
Amino Acids, Case COMP/36.545/F3, OJ (L152), ¶ 162 (June 7, 2000).
Plasterboard, Case COMP/E-1/37.152, C(2002)4570 Final, ¶ 364 (Nov 27, 2002).
Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action at 190–91 (cited in note 18).
Id at 307.
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past the narrow issue of the suppression of interfirm rivalry in cartel
investigations, expanding the scope of their investigations to monopolization
conducts of all sorts and varieties that cartels may subsequently adopt once the
cartel begins to function as a single dominant firm. For example, when
addressing amnesty applicants and in depositions, antitrust authorities could ask
whether there were any monopolization conducts and inquire about the specific
conducts listed in Table 1. Parties damaged could also be asked about the
presence of monopolization conduct.
Second, some rows have no entries. In other words, for some cartels there
is nothing in the record that we reviewed that suggests monopolization-like
conduct. This observation does not imply the absence of such behaviors by
these cartels, but rather that there was nothing reported regarding such conduct.
One might hypothesize that some cartels did not engage in monopolization
because they were having difficulties with the basic suppression of rivalry and so
the cartel was unable to achieve the market power necessary to function as a
dominant entity and engage in monopolization. Such a hypothesis suggests that
we would observe less monopolization behavior from relatively ineffective
cartels and more from effective cartels. There are examples in our data that
support this, such as the cartel in Carbonless Paper,30 which appears to have been
relatively ineffective, and for which there is no evidence of monopolization
conduct. However, our data are insufficient to allow us to make a firm
conclusion. For example, the Food Flavour Enhancers cartel appears to have been
relatively effective,31 but we find no evidence in the record of monopolization
conduct.32
Third, for the EC cases, behavior directed specifically at deterring entry is
relatively uncommon while, in contrast, this same conduct is pervasively
reported in SW. This difference may reflect the fact that SW reports the
historical evolution of an industry, and the cartels within it, so it would be more
natural for long-term conduct such as entry deterrence to be reported by SW
than by the EC, where the latter is analyzing a specific violation.

30

31

32

Carbonless Paper, Case COMP/E-1/36.212, 2004/337/EC, ¶¶ 166, 106 (Dec 20, 2001) (including
discussion of how certain attempted price increases were ineffective and concerns about
cheating).
Food Flavour Enhancers, Case COMP/C.37.671, 2004/206/EC, ¶ 64 (Dec 17, 2002). The execution
of “counterpurchase agreements” by the cartel suggests few problems with monitoring and
enforcement within the cartel.
With regard to Food Flavour Enhancers, the leading firm in this cartel is Ajinomoto (“Aji”). Aji
produces a full range of amino acids and was a member of the Lysine cartel. See id, ¶ 136. The
absence of monopolization conduct for Aji-cartels is perhaps suggestive of the EC’s inability to
gain access to a Japanese firm’s company records through investigatory processes.
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Fourth, there are some EC decisions that give attention to monopolization
behavior such as those in Vitamins,33 Graphites (including Specialty Graphites,34
Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products,35 and Graphite Electrodes36),
Incandescent Electric Lamps,37 and Chemicals.38 Firms in industries with a history of
successful cartel activity that includes a relatively full portfolio of
monopolization conduct may warrant extra attention from enforcement
authorities.39
Depending on how one is using these data, alternative ways of categorizing
the behaviors may be useful. For example, it might be useful to organize the data
in terms of whether the monopolization behavior was implemented through
contracts or negotiations, such as exclusive dealing, bundling, tying, conditional
rebates, and certain vertical restraints, or perhaps whether it relied on
governmental process, such as patent abuse, innovation suppression, standards
abuse, or other torts or extortion as part of an attempt to monopolize. In
particular, a well-designed taxonomy could be of great assistance to antitrust
enforcement authorities.
In this light, finally, it is important for antitrust enforcement authorities to
realize that the initiation of monopolization conduct by non-dominant firms in a
concentrated industry may be an indicator of cartel activity, especially when
observed following a period of unexpected price increases. This potential cartel
detection mechanism has three advantages. First, monopolization conducts may
be more observable than the suppression of interfirm rivalry (for example,
exclusive dealing is easier to observe than bid rigging). Second, the enforcement
investigation is triggered by a combination of observable changes in firm
behavior and data analysis. Third, once firms understand that such conduct
increases the likelihood of a cartel investigation, firms engaged in cartel activity
will be deterred from such conduct, the payoff to collusion will drop through
the mitigation of some cartel monopolization conducts, and cartel conduct will
be somewhat deterred.
In summary, monopolization conduct by cartels is relatively common, but
there appears to be substantial variation between cartels in the extent and nature
33
34
35

36
37
38
39

Vitamins, COMP/E-1/37.512, 2001 OJ (L6), ¶ 2.
Specialty Graphite, Case COMP/E-2/37.667, ¶¶ 1–3.
Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products, Case C.38.359, 2004/420/EC, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec 3,
2003).
Graphite Electrodes, Case COMP/E-1/36.490, 202/271/EC, ¶¶ 1–2 (July 18, 2001).
Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action at 304–62 (cited in note 18).
Id at 363–429.
The cartels in Incandescent Electric Lamps and Alkalies, Explosives, and the Grand Alliance, as described
by Stocking and Watkins, are good examples. See id at 304–62, 430–48.
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of this conduct. It is important that public enforcement authorities, when
investigating specific cartels, gather exhaustive information about
monopolization conduct, including the motivations and intents for these
conducts as revealed by cartel participants, so as to advance our understanding
of monopolization.

IV. C ONCLUSION : P OLICY I MPLICATIONS
Recognition of the analytical and behavioral links between the historically
separate areas of cartel and dominant-firm behavior suggests a number of future
directions for public enforcement policy and research by competition
authorities. First, competition agencies should more fully explore and catalogue
evidence of monopolization conduct on the part of cartels. Economists and
lawyers within the public agencies in Europe and the United States have
incomparably large bodies of data involving cartels, and other competition
agencies have access to an increasingly broad range of information regarding the
conduct of cartels. This information has the potential to extend well beyond the
kind of standard descriptions that are found in EC decisions or in published case
reports in the United States.40 If this work is undertaken effectively inside public
agencies that traditionally have placed cartel and monopolization matters in
discrete compartments, then perhaps the artificial nature of this
compartmentalization will become obvious and the experience of those who
have focused on cartel cases will add to the analyses of those addressing
monopolization concerns.
Second, we need to understand better the information reported in EC
decisions and other official accounts of cartels. Decisions written narrowly to
describe only Section 1 violations may truncate many monopolization behaviors.
In other words, the omission of Section 2 conduct in a description of a Section 1
violation does not necessarily imply the absence of Section 2 conduct.
Third, we need to understand under what circumstances cartels extend past
the suppression of intra-cartel rivalry and move into the realm of
monopolization conduct. A number of conjectures arise in this regard. If a cartel
struggles to suppress interfirm rivalry among its members, then it seems unlikely
the cartel can undertake monopolization conduct. In other words, a cartel has to
function as a single dominant firm in order to move forward with some kind of
monopolization conduct.

40

Many of the cases included in Table 1 have US counterparts involving many of the same market
participants. Examples include: Amino Acids (Lysine), Citric Acid, Choline Chloride, Graphite Electrodes,
and Vitamins.
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Fourth, some cartels engage in a full range of monopolization behaviors.
As Table 1 shows, examples include Vitamins, Specialty Graphites, Incandescent
Electric Lamps, and Chemicals. Other cartels engage only in a limited set of
monopolization conduct. What accounts for this heterogeneity? There are many
ways for a cartel to increase its members’ profits. It is reasonable to assume that
cartels select those behaviors that offer the greatest expected return. Thus,
heterogeneity in the use of monopolization behavior may be explained by
heterogeneity in the expected returns from those behaviors across different
cartels. It remains an open question what features of an industry, product, and
marketplace help explain these differences.
Fifth, as a direct lesson for the study of monopolization conduct, we argue
that when a successful cartel engages in such activities there may be a
presumption that the activity is not procompetitive. Cartels exist to suppress
competition. When a cartel goes past the suppression of intra-cartel rivalry to
initiate or coordinate additional conduct known to be potentially
anticompetitive, it seems reasonable to assert that such conduct is
anticompetitive in this situation. This observation is valuable because it suggests
that cross-industry comparisons can help us understand the procompetitive and
anticompetitive nature of such conduct. For example, if we see a particular form
of exclusive dealing by cartel firms in the auto industry, then the same kind of
exclusive dealing by a single dominant firm in the truck industry may be of much
greater concern than one might have thought before understanding the conduct
in the auto case.
To give another example, loyalty rebates are one practice that, theoretically
speaking, can sometimes be procompetitive and sometimes anticompetitive.41
We see evidence of the anticompetitive use of loyalty discounts by cartels in
Vitamins42 and Soda Ash—Solvay.43 Further examination of these cases may shed
light on general circumstances in which loyalty discounts should be of concern
to antitrust authorities.
Sixth, what is the incremental social harm that a cartel could do by moving
past the suppression of interfirm rivalry and toward monopolization conduct?
This question is relevant for merger policy. Coordinated effects analyses typically
do not address the possibility of monopolization conduct arising from post-

41

42
43

Loyalty rebates are retrospective rebates awarded based on meeting targets for sales, purchases,
market shares, etc. over a fixed period of time. For a discussion of legal issues surrounding loyalty
rebates, see generally Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics at 570–79 (cited
in note 10).
Vitamins, COMP/E-1/37.512, ¶ 714.
Soda Ash—Solvay, COMP/33.133-C, OJ (L10), ¶ 53 (Dec 13, 2000).
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merger coordination. However, such conduct is a potential social harm, so the
antitrust agencies should consider this when reviewing a merger.
Seventh, the study of cartel monopolization conduct has implications for
determining the standing of non-cartel firms to bring private suits against the
cartel. Courts sometimes deny non-cartel participants in the industry standing to
sue the cartel on the ground that the suppression of interfirm rivalry within the
cartel yields price-raising benefits to non-participants. However, if a cartel is
engaged in predation or in other anticompetitive conduct that damages
horizontal non-cartel producers, then perhaps consideration should be given to
allowing those firms to have standing to challenge the monopolization behavior.
The logic would be that exclusionary conduct undertaken by the cartel may
damage non-cartel rivals. Without a guilty plea or a criminal finding of both
collusion and attempted monopolization, a non-cartel firm may find the task of
appearing before a court to seek damages from such predation daunting and the
court unreceptive.
Eighth, the time series nature of the evolution of the conduct can be
informative.44 Cartel meetings that previously were dedicated to coordinating the
suppression of rivalry may start to have new agenda items related to
monopolization conduct.45 These are perhaps put into place slowly. The costs of
implementing them may be divided among the cartel participants.46 Although the
discovery records for cartels are not often read from the perspective of Section 2
violations, we argue that these records provide insights into monopolization
conduct within industries where there is a single dominant firm.
Ninth, suppose there is an oligopolistic industry with no dominant firm
and with no known cartel, yet some firms, perhaps smaller ones, are subject to
predatory conduct and other behavior associated with Section 2 violations. The
initiation of such conduct might provide evidence that a cartel exists. Consider
the predatory conduct enumerated in Table 1. The cartels seem to have
undertaken this conduct only after the cartel was formed. We are not aware of
instances in which antitrust agencies have used the emergence of alleged

44

45

46

See William E. Kovacic et al, Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel in V. Ghosal and
J. Stennek, eds, The Political Economy of Antitrust, Contributions to Economic Analysis Series 149, 150–
152 (Elsevier 2007) (providing an analysis of cartel beginning and ending dates in Vitamins).
See generally Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, and Matthew E. Raiff, Price Announcements: The
Vitamins Industry, 26 Intl J Ind Org 762 (2008) (discussing how timing of cartel price
announcements in Vitamins can be related to timing of cartel meetings).
For example, in the EC’s Copper Plumbing Tubes decision, the Commission noted the costs of
“advertising campaigns and related activities” were shared among cartel members “on the basis of
sold tonnage.” Copper Plumbing Tubes, COMP/E-1/38.069, ¶ 141 (Sept 3, 2004).
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monopolization conduct in an oligopolistic industry to begin an inquiry for the
presence of a cartel.
Tenth, the abuse of government regulations by cartels to thwart entry and
damage non-cartel firms is well chronicled. A cartel may pursue and win an antidumping claim against a foreign competitor, essentially using the government
process as an entry deterrent and/or predatory device.
In summary, we hope the type of analysis proposed here can be useful in
guiding antitrust authorities as to where they should direct monopolization
resources. One implication of this Article is that antitrust authorities should not
segregate the analysis of Section 1 and Section 2 cases. A second implication is
that antitrust authorities pursuing Section 1 violations should aggressively
investigate the presence or absence of monopolization behaviors by the cartel,
including the deliberations among cartel members associated with these
behaviors.
For many monopolization behaviors there are tradeoffs between the
procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of the behavior. This justifies the
use of a rule-of-reason standard in these cases. But because the rule of reason is
applied, a deep understanding of the motivations for and implications of
monopolization conduct is required in order to successfully prosecute and deter
anticompetitive behavior. We argue that one way to move in the direction of
that deeper understanding is to maximize the information gained from cartel
prosecutions regarding monopolization conduct and to use that information to
inform the analysis of monopolization cases.
In our ongoing research, we will continue to investigate the issues
discussed here and the features of cartel structure more generally. Our
investigation of the structure of cartels has the potential to help us understand
the additional tradeoffs relevant for cartels considering monopolization
behavior. For example, there may be monopolization behaviors that are
profitable for the cartel but that leave smaller cartel members in a precarious
position should the cartel dissolve.47 In this case, there may not be consensus
within the cartel to engage in the behavior. Thus, a cartel’s structure can be
expected to influence the conduct in which it engages. We hope our
investigations of cartel structure will shed light on these issues, and, as
emphasized in this Article, potentially benefit our understanding of the behavior
of single dominant firms.

47

An example would be establishing the largest cartel member as a buying agent for inputs for the
cartel, supported by exclusive dealing provisions between input suppliers and the largest cartel
member.
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